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CHAPTER

15

Accountability
for Mass Death, Acts
of Rescue, and Silence
in Rwanda

Jennie E. Burnet

Nearly 25 years after the 1994 genocide of Tutsis, Rwanda still struggles with the long‐term
consequences of mass death and destruction. Between April 6 and July 4, 1994, an estimated
800,000 Rwandans lost their lives in a state‐sponsored genocide that targeted ethnic Tutsis
(United Nations Security Council 1999).1 Accountability for the innumerable individual
and collective acts that constituted the genocide has been sought through an ad hoc international tribunal, foreign courts, Rwandan courts, and a transitional justice mechanism
known as the Gacaca tribunals. This accountability for death sought to mete out justice to
the hundreds of thousands of accused perpetrators and planners who had engaged in
criminal acts ranging from theft to rape and mass murder.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), created by the UN Security
Council on November 8, 1994, was set up with the intention of prosecuting the genocide’s
architects, who had fled the country. Rwandan views of the ICTR were not always positive.
Rwandans, including government spokespeople, criticized the ICTR because those prosecuted by it faced lesser penalties than those tried inside Rwanda and enjoyed comparatively
“luxurious” prison conditions. They condemned the vast resources consumed by the
ICTR, which could have been used to rehabilitate Rwanda’s legal system and police force.
The ICTR moved slowly and prosecuted only 28 defendants during the first 10 years of its
operation.2
In Rwanda the new government, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel
group that stopped the genocide when it seized power, attempted to hold accountable
every single perpetrator from national leaders down to lowly, subsistence farmers (Waldorf
2006: 3). In 1995 the first genocide trials began in courts that had originally been modeled
on Belgian courts in the postindependence period. These early cases resulted in the first and
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only public executions of convicted genocide perpetrators in April 1997. The approach of
maximal prosecutions constituted a radical departure from precedents in other postconflict
countries and overwhelmed the justice system. The government eventually turned to a
novel solution by reinventing a conflict resolution mechanism, known as gacaca, that had
been used since the precolonial period to resolve community conflicts.3 Beginning with a
pilot phase in 2001, a nationwide rollout in 2005, and numerous revisions and adjustments
to the law and procedures, the Gacaca tribunals tried over 1.9 million cases and found guilty
verdicts in over 1.6 million cases (Gacaca Community Justice 2017). Upon the courts’
closure and the repeal of the laws creating them in 2012, thousands of unclosed cases were
transferred to the country’s ordinary courts.
Outside Rwanda, foreign governments prosecuted Rwandans for genocide crimes under
universal jurisdiction. In 2001 Belgium prosecuted two Roman Catholic nuns for genocide
crimes and found them guilty along with two men (BBC News 2001). In the United States
of America, whose legal statutes do not allow for such prosecutions, the government
prosecuted genocide perpetrators for immigration fraud. In 2012 Prudence Katengwa was
convicted of immigration fraud, perjury, and obstruction of justice in Boston for lying to
enter the United States and seek asylum status (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
2012). In 2013 Beatrice Munyenyezi was sentence to 10 years in prison for lying to US
government officials while seeking citizenship (Tuohy 2013).
These legal attempts to prosecute and punish genocide perpetrators constitute a kind
of accountability for death. Yet, they are necessarily partial because they can only pass
judgment on criminal acts. They do not encompass the moral culpability of those who
failed to defend Tutsis against their attackers (often called “bystanders” in genocide
studies); of the UN peacekeepers who abandoned Rwandans seeking shelter at UN
compounds; or of the UN secretary‐general who refused to expand the peacekeepers’
mandate so that they could use force to protect civilians. From a humanistic perspective,
this legal accountability does not encompass an accountability for life. Should we not
investigate the opportunities, motivations, and actions of those who attempted to protect
or to save lives during the genocide?
In this chapter I attempt to account for the acts of rescue and the moments of good that
occurred in the midst of mass death and evil of genocide. In addition, I try to understand
the factors that distinguish between rescuer behavior and rescuers. I use the term “rescuer
behavior” to describe actions taken to protect, evacuate, or otherwise assist Tutsis. I apply
this terms regardless of whether the people providing assistance may also have participated
in the genocide. Rescuer behavior was very common in the Rwandan genocide even though
genocide architects intentionally sought widespread popular participation. Many people
resisted participating in the genocide for weeks or even months by refusing to take part in
security patrols or by staying home, feigning sickness, to avoid participating in mob violence. I refer to this behavior as “genocide resistance” and to the people enacting it as
“genocide resisters.” Although I do not discuss this category at length in this chapter, the
majority of non‐Tutsi Rwandans fell into this category. Many of them assisted Tutsis and
other people targeted for killing for as long as they were able. Furthermore, the majority of
perpetrators fell into this category for days, weeks, or even months before they succumbed
to the polyvalent pressures to participate. Even the most enthusiastic perpetrators sometimes helped Tutsi kin, friends, neighbors, classmates, or even strangers. In some cases,
participating in the genocide increased a person’s ability to save other people. I reserve the
term “rescuer” for those who protected or evacuated Tutsis, or made other efforts to save
them and who did not participate in the genocide whether by killing, raping, destroying
property, or looting. Rescuers were exceptional. They required not only the impulse to help
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but also the persistence to make the decision both to rescue and not to participate
repeatedly over time. I draw on interview data and ethnographic observation in eight
communities conducted in Rwanda in 2011, 2013, and 2014 with my coinvestigator,
Hager El‐Hadidi, as well as data collected in my earlier ethnographic research in Rwanda
between 1997 and 2002.4
I first describe what Primo Levi called the moral “grey zone” of genocide. I assert that
the grey zone forms the context for the morally complex decision‐making of ordinary
citizens, including not only victims but also certain perpetrators, bystanders, and even
rescuers. In this section, I also summarize what we already know about perpetrator behavior
in the Rwanda genocide and elaborate a theoretical framework for understanding rescuers
and rescuer behavior. Next, I describe the acts of rescue, opportunities, motivations, and
decision‐making of rescuers in the Rwandan genocide. I conclude by describing the ways in
which these stories of rescuers have been silenced in Rwanda and the implications of this
silence for genocide survivors, their rescuers, and society as a whole.

The Moral Grey Zone
As Holocaust survivor and author Primo Levi (1989: 58) wrote about concentration
camps in Nazi Europe, genocide produces a moral grey zone “of ambiguity which
radiates out from regimes based on terror and obsequiousness” and where “the network
of human relations … could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and persecutors”
(Levi 1989: 37).5 Levi describes the ways in which concentration camp prisoners participated in their oppression and debasement through complicit acceptance of the situation,
initiation into the social hierarchies that determined who lived (longer) and who died, or
active collaboration as a camp leader or member of the squads who ran the gas chambers
and crematoria. Levi elaborates:
terror, ideological seduction, servile imitation of the victor, myopic desire for any power
whatsoever, even though ridiculously circumscribed in space and time, cowardice, and finally,
lucid calculation aimed at eluding the imposed orders and order. All these motives, singly or
combined, have come into play in the creation of this grey zone, whose components are bonded
together by the wish to preserve and consolidate established privilege vis‐à‐vis those without
privilege. (Levi 1989: 43)

In other words, camp prisoners found themselves faced with innumerable, impossible
decisions in the pursuit of survival that, nevertheless, almost certainly ended in death. Levi
concludes that the moral ambiguity of this space must be explored and recognized even if
the prisoners do not bear the moral culpability of the SS soldiers running the camps or of the
“very structure of the totalitarian state” that produced this evil system (Levi 1989: 42–43).
In his deployment of the concept, Levi reserves the term “grey zone” mainly for concentration
camp prisoners who collaborated with the Nazi guards and SS officers running the camp.
Levi implies that the concept could be extended to Nazi guards who assisted prisoners by,
for example, trading food for gold or valuables. He writes: “it is a grey zone, poorly defined,
where the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge” (Levi 1989: 42).
Crucial to the concept as Levi defines it is the moral ambiguity of decision‐making in the
grey zone. While certain Nazi guards may be included, the camp commander would be
excluded, as would SS soldiers who carried out their duties without reticence or who did not
recognize prisoners as human beings deserving of respect, mercy, or assistance.
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Taking the moral grey zone of the concentration camp and applying it to the Rwandan
genocide, where ordinary citizens were mobilized to participate, illuminates the ways in
which individuals – whether as potential victims, rescuers, bystanders, or perpetrators – faced complex and morally ambiguous decisions on a daily, sometimes even a
minute‐by‐minute, basis. Within genocide studies, the categories of victim, perpetrator,
bystanders, and rescuers have become fairly standardized. As Fujii points out, however,
these categories “can obscure as much as they reveal” (2011: 145) because they reduce a
person, with their often contradictory beliefs and actions, to an expected set of behaviors.
Furthermore, it hides the reality that many people may pass from one of these categories
to another over the course of a genocide or during mass atrocities. By shifting the focus
away from these categories alone and concentrating instead on “acts of genocide” and
“acts of rescue,” we can understand the ways in which complex decisions and behaviors
emerge in the dynamic set of social, political, and economic processes that constitute
a genocide.
From the perspective of categories, it may appear obvious that rescuers do not operate
from a morally ambiguous position and thus should not be considered as part of the grey
zone. If, instead, we focus on an individual’s many different actions over the course of a
genocide, we begin to see that they are constantly faced with decisions made in morally
ambiguous positions. We found several cases where rescuers denied assistance to someone
in order to ensure the protection of others. In one case an orphanage director was protecting hundreds of orphans, including hundreds whose parents had already been killed in the
genocide (interview by author, Kigali, March 2014). Three priests from the parish church
took refuge on the grounds of the orphanage but they had been seen entering by a neighbor,
who informed the militias and the local police. The orphanage director explained to the
priests that they were not safe at the orphanage and that they were endangering the children
by remaining there. The director feared that the police would enter to search for the Tutsi
priests and then allow the militias in to attack the children and orphanage staff. The priests
left voluntarily but were then killed in another hiding place nearby. As he recounted the
story, the orphanage director was clearly emotionally tormented by his moral complicity in
the priests’ deaths, yet he was certain that allowing the priests to stay would have made it
impossible for him to continue to protect the children and the orphanage staff. As I shall
explain in more detail, the concept of the moral grey zone, combined with a focus on the
acts – whether of genocide, resistance, or rescue – committed by individuals, can help us
understand the complex interplay between internal and external factors shaping the
decision‐making of ordinary citizens during mass violence.
A nearly universal explanation of motive given by participants in communal violence
or genocide is that they were simply obeying orders (Hinton 2005: 276–277). Stanley
Milgram’s (1974) obedience studies in the 1960s highlighted the willingness of average
people to inflict pain on strangers by obeying the instructions of research study personnel.
Similarly, Hannah Arendt (1963) argued that extremely evil acts could be perpetrated in a
“banal” manner if situational constraints were strong enough. This obedience explanation
“highlights a key dynamic involved in genocide. In some situations … perpetrators are
heavily pressured … to obey orders” (Hinton 2005: 279). In this context, resistance or
refusal to participate is an exception (Andrieu 2011: 495). Yet, explanations based on
obedience are only partial as they ignore the “intense rage” or “hatred” that might accompany it and cannot explain the “patterns of violence” that often emerge in genocide
(Hinton 2005: 279). The leveling effects and political psychology of crowds play a role
in shaping individuals’ behavior so that they behave in unexpected ways, engaging in
scapegoating and jubilant destruction (Tambiah 1996: 266–296). Genocidal priming and
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genocidal activation make genocide possible at the societal level, creating a context that
shapes the decision‐making of individual perpetrators (Hinton 2005).
The individual decision‐making of mid‐ and low‐level perpetrators has been well researched
in Rwanda. Straus (2006) and Fujii (2009) reject the predominant explanatory theory of
genocide: people kill out of ethnic hatred. While high‐level perpetrators, what Rwandans call
Interahamwe z’interahamwe (Interahamwe of the Interahamwe), went on a murderous
rampage during the first five days, the genocide did not become a national policy until April 12
(Guichaoua 2015: 242; Straus 2006: 50). Average citizens, who were mobilized during
organized phases that occurred later, made calculated decisions about whether or not to
participate. The ongoing civil war between the Rwandan government and the RPF provided
the “essential rationale for mass killing: security” (Straus 2006: 8). Average civilians who
participated found it morally tolerable to kill because they believed they were protecting
their family’s, the community’s, or the nation’s security. Second, Rwandan state institutions
penetrated deep into local communities, making it possible for centrally ordered commands to be carried out in rural communities throughout the country (Straus 2006: 8).
Finally, the established social category “Tutsi” identified the targets of violence once the
massacres started. In the years leading up to the genocide, extremist propaganda promoted
the idea that all Tutsis were allies of the rebel RPF. During the genocide, Rwandan national
radio and extremists in control of the government continued to equate “Tutsi” with “enemy,”
and declared that “the enemy must be eliminated” (Straus 2006: 9).
The lowest‐level participants, whom Fujii labels “joiners,” are the most puzzling subcategory
of perpetrators because they “had the most to lose and the least to gain from participating,”
and they were the most affected by the genocide’s destruction (2009: 16). Fujii concludes
that local ties – defined as kinship, economic exchange, shared workplace, political affiliation, or education – and group dynamics mediated individual choices and actions at
any given moment during the genocide. This approach makes it possible to explain why
the same individual or family may have killed Tutsis at a roadblock at the same time as
they hid and protected Tutsis in their home. The standard analytical categories of genocide
(perpetrator, victim, bystander, and rescuer) are limited because an individual may simultaneously occupy two or more categories, or their categorization may change over time as
they make decisions based on the situation in the moment (Fujii 2009: 8). Time is a final
important factor in understanding perpetrator decision‐making and behavior (Fujii 2009;
Hinton 2005). Individual perpetrators’ motivations do not remain constant over time.
Even if a perpetrator first participates because of extreme structural constraints, he or she
may later become desensitized to the “psychosocial dissonance” resulting from breaking
moral prohibitions against harming other humans (Hinton 2005: 288). Or perpetrators
may kill certain targets at roadblocks while sheltering other potential victims in their homes
(Fujii 2009, 2011).
Two competing theories of rescuer behavior dominate research on the issue. One school
of thought based primarily on analyses of rescuers during the Holocaust emphasizes
intrinsic, individual features of moral behavior such as character, identity, and personality
(see Monroe 1996, 2004; Oliner and Oliner 1988, 1995; Oliner et al. 1992). Based on her
analysis of life history interviews with Yad Vashem‐certified “Righteous,” Monroe (2004:
241) argues that “ethical political behavior flows naturally from our perceptions of self.”
Her theory posits that “ethical acts emanate not so much from conscious choice but rather
from deep‐seated instincts, predispositions, and habitual patterns of behavior that are
related to our central identity” and that are “effectively preset for most adults” (Monroe
2004: 241). The other school of thought based on comparative analysis of rescuers in
World War II, the Armenian genocide, and Rwanda focuses on extrinsic features affecting
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rescuer behavior such as geography, proximity to victims, presence of other minorities,
details of genocidal policy, and opportunity (see the collection edited by Sémelin, Andrieu,
and Gensburger 2008, 2011). From this perspective, rescuers “do not necessarily have a
stable ‘personality’” (Andrieu 2011: 499), and constraints of time, space, and context,
instead, play just as important a role as internal moral character. As I shall elaborate, this
research demonstrates that a complex interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic factors structured the behavior and choices not only of rescuers but also of genocide resisters, bystanders,
victims, and perpetrators.
In the Rwandan genocide, rescuers, just like perpetrators and victims, operated in a moral
grey zone, making impossible choices innumerable times each day or night. The empirical
data in Rwanda are clear: some perpetrators killed people while they simultaneously hid or
protected others at home or smuggled them to safety (Fujii 2009, 2011). In some instances
perpetrators participated in mass violence in groups, but as individuals they helped kin,
neighbors, or even strangers escape the slaughter. In other cases, participating in the genocide provided a sort of shield that enabled them to save people.
As a Muslim man, Ali,6 who had confessed to genocide crimes, explained:
Those who survived, in my mother’s family, sought refuge at our home. They were able to
survive and they are still there. There is one who was at our home while another one was at
my big brother’s place. We had shared them among us. We said that if there was a chance for
us to survive, we would have at least one of the members saved, to keep the whole family from
perishing. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)

Ali was 20 years old at the time of the genocide. Born to a Hutu father and Tutsi mother,
he was harassed and faced intense pressure to participate in the killings because he was a
young man and because his parentage made the Interahamwe and Hutu Power supporters
suspicious of him. As Ali continued:
During that period of the Genocide, there were people who were called ibyimanyi [crossbreeds].
people who were born from a Hutu and a Tutsi. At that time [people like me were] harassed.
When they went on their rounds [security patrols] through the neighborhoods, they would
look for people who didn’t share their ideologies and they would say that those crossbreeds
were not people one could trust completely. They used to wake me up at night and say that
there was no way they would spend the night watching while a Tutsi slept. They used to tell me
that I was indeed my mother’s son but they said I was not my father’s son. They used to say
“look at how tall he is! Look at his nose.” And check all the characteristics they used to check
and see me as … I don’t know. They viewed me as someone who didn’t share their ideologies.
They would then make me get up and make rounds, saying that there was no way they were
going to watch over me as I was sleeping. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)

Beyond the harassment he faced from the Interahamwe in the streets or in his own home,
Ali’s father advised him to go on security patrols as a way to protect himself and the family.
Ali clarified:
[my father] told me, “Get up and be with them, do not kill if they do. Just go with them and sit
where they sit, to show them that you’re with them. If they keep on saying that you are an
accomplice they will kill you as well.” So … I would go with them … Sometimes when they came
to wake me up, [my father] would give me money they called “flashlight fees” to buy batteries for
the flashlights they would use at night. That was money they bought alcohol with … he would
give them like 5,000 francs to buy me a night off. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)
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At the time of the genocide, both Ali and his family understood his actions as a way to
avoid participating in the genocide while giving the appearance of compliance to local
officials and Interahamwe militias. In an interview in 2011, Ali had insisted that he had not
participated in the genocide. Instead, he claimed that he had confessed as a way to reduce
his sentence and leave prison. In 2013 he understood his actions in a new light. As he
explained:
I was accused and put in prison … Then, I listened to what the Government came to teach us
in prison about admitting crimes. I told them, “Given that I didn’t kill anyone, what shall I
confess to?” But because I listened to what they taught us, I finally understood that genocide
crimes are not about getting a machete and killing only. Genocide is a collective crime. Some
people were accomplices. Others contributed to the planning and did the deed itself, but even
the fact that you were standing all three together made the one who was killing confident
because he knew that he was with you. That made the one you had gone to kill weaker and kept
him from defending himself. What might he have done if there had been one killer? But because
we were three, it made the killer strong. (Interview by author, Gisenyi, October 2013)

The evolution in Ali’s thinking illustrates the influence of national narratives and state‐building
practices to promote reconciliation. These efforts compel perpetrators and bystanders to
accept their legal and moral complicity in the genocide. Furthermore, Ali’s story as a whole
illuminates the terrible complexity of the moral grey zone. As elaborated on later, Ali’s
geographic location in a neighborhood dominated by Hutu Power politicians and
Interahamwe militias afforded him little opportunity to escape their coercive power.

Acts of Rescue
In the midst of the mass death, some courageous people refused to participate in the
genocide. Propaganda by Hutu extremists blaming Tutsis en masse for the ongoing civil
war and the economic problems of the country had transformed social norms in the years
leading up to the genocide. Once the genocide began, the Hutu Power movement quickly
mobilized the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias to attack and kill Tutsis. Over the
span of a few weeks, they attempted to engage the entire population in its genocidal project.
They transformed everyday mechanisms for mobilizing the adult male population, like
nightly security rounds and monthly communal labor (umuganda), into enforcement
mechanisms for the genocide. Through these means, average civilian men who were reluctant to join in the killing were initiated into the violence, first by participating in searches
for people in hiding, then by participating in mob violence, and later by participating in
killings. Sometimes coercion was used to get people to comply. In this context, the simple
act of refusing to participate can be viewed as a courageous one.
Beyond refusing to participate, many people, including Hutus, Twa, and even Tutsis,
engaged in rescuer behavior by assisting people who were being targeted. They hid Tutsis
in their homes and stables or elsewhere on their property. After being summoned to public
meetings, they warned people about search parties or imminent attacks. They negotiated
the sparing of Tutsi lives using money, cigarettes, beer, or other goods. They hid or protected children whose parents had been killed or whose families asked them to protect
them. They smuggled Tutsis across the border. They gave people in hiding food, water,
clothing, or other assistance. They helped Tutsis flee. In some places where people sought
protection, in churches, mosques, schools, or government buildings, they fought against
attackers and died alongside Tutsis. At a mosque in a rural community in eastern Rwanda,
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Muslims and Christians took refuge in the mosque (Viret 2011). When the Interahamwe
militias came to attack them, they asked the Hutus to leave. They refused to do so and
fought against the militiamen with their Tutsi neighbors (Viret 2011: 492). Most of them
died. In Gisenyi, a town in northwestern Rwanda on the border with Zaire, Félicité
Niyitegeka, a lay minister in the Catholic Church, gave Tutsis shelter at the Centre Pastorale
de St. Pierre and helped them to flee across the border at unofficial crossings at night
(interview by author, Gisenyi, February 2014). Niyitegeka’s brother, a colonel in the
Rwandan army sent her a message asking her to stop her activities and leave so that she
would not be killed. She refused and was taken with approximately 40 Tutsis to the infamous “Commune Rouge” massacre site, where she was murdered along with the others
(multiple interviews by author and by El‐Hadidi, Gisenyi, October 2013 and February
2014). Many rescuers, like Niyitegeka, who hewed closely to their deeply held moral convictions died as martyrs. By refusing to bend their rectitude to the moral ambiguity required
of the grey zone and to make decisions that may sacrifice some while saving others, they
became genocide victims alongside those they sought to protect.
Numerous external factors constrained the opportunity to rescue others, as well as the
likelihood that these actions would be successful. Perhaps the most important of these were
opportunity and proximity (Sémelin, Andrieu, and Gensburger 2008, 2011). In Rwanda
most people had the opportunity, even if only fleetingly, to provide assistance to someone
targeted for killing. Hutus and Tutsis lived interspersed throughout Rwanda, especially in
the cities, although some regions had higher percentages of Tutsis than others. In southern
Rwanda, Tutsis constituted 14 percent to 21 percent of the population in Butare Prefecture
(now part of Southern Province). Administrative officials and the majority of the population
in Butare resisted participating in the genocide for weeks, even though in the neighboring
prefecture of Gikongoro, which had a similar number of Tutsis, killings began immediately.
In Butare, killings did not begin until the governor was removed from office and soldiers
and Interahamwe were bused in from neighboring prefectures to initiate the violence.
In Butare Prefecture, the majority of the population supported opposition political parties
that were opposed to the Hutu Power coalition of extremists who prepared and organized
the genocide. Furthermore, the region had a high rate of intermarriage between Hutus and
Tutsis. These factors made much of the population harder to mobilize for the genocide
project.
In northern and western Rwanda, where the Hutu Power movement was very strong, the
population was more quickly mobilized. Killings in Gisenyi town started on the morning of
April 7, as soon as Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militia members organized attack
squads to search neighborhoods and set up roadblocks. In Gisenyi (now part of Western
Province) and Byumba prefectures (now part of Northern Province) Tutsis constituted 1
percent to 7 percent of the population and in Ruhengeri (now part of Northern Province)
they were less than 1 percent of the population in 1994 (Guichaoua 2015: x). In these
communities, people had few opportunities to rescue potential victims. Yet, the lack of
Tutsis did not keep the population from participating in the killing. Men were mobilized to
go and attack Tutsis in neighboring communities. In a rural community in the highlands,
one perpetrator, Jean, explained how he went with a group of about 30 men to attack a
homestead down near the shore of Lake Kivu:
The way Satan came that day: it’s as a young man from down there, where that person died. He
told me that there was a cow somewhere, which he was going to sell me at a low price. I used
to be a butcher at that time. When I heard that I was buying a cow at a low price, I went. When
we got there, the cow was that side, they untied it. I left with the cow, the others stayed behind.
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That person [who lived there, who owned the cow] stayed behind, too. Those who stayed behind
attacked him and they killed him. (Interview by author, Kayove district, Western Province,
October 2013)

In this community where fewer than a handful of Tutsis lived in 1994, local men were
recruited to attack squads that went elsewhere to kill. Thus, geography played a structuring
role in the violence as well as in rescue.
The border provided great opportunities for rescue, although they were also used to trap
Tutsis evading the death squads. In Gisenyi segments of the border were open in 1994.
Many properties on the border were used as smuggling routes and they became routes to
evacuate people during the genocide. Many traders who engaged in smuggling as part of
their business used the same means and methods to smuggle Tutsis across the border. Two
indakemwe saved the lives of dozens of Tutsis in this way. An old woman in Gisenyi smuggled Tutsi children across the border in broad daylight. She took the children one by one
across the border, telling the police and border guards that they were her grandchildren.7
She crossed the border and left the children with relatives in Goma and then returned to
Rwanda at a different border crossing. With these means, she saved the lives more than
seven Tutsi children whose parents had been killed in her neighborhood. She took these
actions despite her daughter’s objections.
In other communities, physical geography provided escape routes from massacre sites
or banana plantations, forests, or marshes as places to hide. In communities along the
shores of Lake Kivu, the local population used boats for fishing and trade across the
lake. During the genocide, many used their boats to evacuate Tutsis across the lake to
Zaire, to Gisenyi, where they could continue on to Congo, or to Kibuye, where many
of them subsequently perished. In Mugandamure in southern Rwanda, its history as a
Swahili camp during colonialism made it easy for residents to erect roadblocks to close
the neighborhood off to outsiders.8 Residents then smuggled in Tutsis and hid them in
their homes. On at least one occasion, a group of Interahamwe accompanied by soldiers
forced their way into the neighborhood searching for specific people whom they knew
were hiding in the neighborhood. These people were taken to a public square and
killed. Nonetheless, the community succeeded in saving an unknown number of people
in this way.
Local histories of communal violence between 1959 and 1973 and genocide priming in
the early 1990s further shaped the unfolding of the genocide in communities across the
country. In Nkora and Boneza in Western Province, many Tutsi genocide survivors
recounted how Tutsis had been targeted during periods of ethnic violence in 1959, 1963–
1964, and 1973.9 During those episodes, mobs came down from the mountains to steal
their cattle, destroy their property, and physically assault or even kill them. In the week after
the RPF invasion in 1990, groups of men again attacked Tutsi homesteads in Boneza. The
pattern continued in 1994 during the genocide with massacres in these communities being
initiated by bands of Interahamwe coming down from the mountains. In Gisenyi town,
genocide priming played a significant role. Within days of the RPF invasion of Rwanda in
October 1990, there were instances of mob violence targeting Tutsis in Gisenyi. Gisenyi
was also the stronghold of the Hutu Power movement within the dominant, state political
party (MRND) and of a Hutu extremist party (CDR). Virtually all adult men in Gisenyi
were members of either the MRND or the CDR. Male youth were under extreme pressure
to join the Interahamwe. Killings of Tutsis began in Gisenyi as early as 10 a.m. on the morning
of April 7, 1994. Killings also began in the capital city, Kigali, in the early hours of April 7,
within hours of the president’s plane being shot down.
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In southern Rwanda, on the other hand, killings did not start until April 21 or 22, 1994.
The governor of Butare, as well as the mayor of Nyanza, were opposed to the genocide and
refused to implement it. On April 20, 1994, the interim president gave a speech in Butare
and then replaced the governor. The genocide began the next day. In Nyanza, the killings
started on April 22, after groups of soldiers were brought in on trucks the day before. On
the first day, the Nyanza mayor was publicly lynched, which created an atmosphere of
terror. Although the genocide was fierce and swift once it had begun, the RPF rebel group
seized the region quickly, bringing the genocide to an end within a few weeks. In nearby
Mugandamure, the RPF’s swift arrival allowed Muslim residents who had hidden and
protected Tutsis to succeed in their acts of rescue.
Community structure and social networks significantly shaped individuals’ behavior
during the genocide. Research by Fujii (2011) and McDoom (2014) has found that
Rwandans who had more social connections with perpetrators were much more likely to
become genocide perpetrators. In two communities where I conducted interviews in
western and southern Rwanda, a history of communal activities among Muslims played a
structural role in individual acts of rescue and in organized efforts among certain social networks to rescue Tutsis. During feast days in these communities, the local Muslim population
included their non‐Muslim neighbors in their celebrations and shared meat with them.
In addition, the local Muslim population organized the feasts, thus creating social relationships and patterns of cooperation. These social relationships led to coordinated efforts
among Muslims in these communities to hide and protect Tutsis in the south or to hide and
evacuate Tutsis to Zaire in the west. In Gisenyi, on the other hand, Muslims were closely
tied to the political elites who became the primary architects of the genocide. Virtually all
Muslim men we interviewed in Gisenyi town said that they were members of the MRND
political party in 1994, whereas Muslim men elsewhere in Rwanda indicated that they had
not joined any party because Islam forbade it. Muslims in Gisenyi, particularly young men,
faced enormous social pressure to join in the violence (as illustrated by Ali’s story).
People who tried to help or save Tutsis indicated that they had the opportunity to do so.
Virtually all genocide survivors described people who could have helped them but refused.
Thus, beyond simple opportunity, rescuers drew on an internal moral compass that guided
their decisions. Most widely, genocide survivors and rescuers themselves described rescuers
as people “who have a good heart” (bafite umutima mwiza), a Kinyarwanda phrase that
encompasses a person’s mind, character, and spirit. As one Muslim woman who, at the age
of 21, saved several Tutsi lives explained:
The reason why some people saved people while others didn’t … it went with the person’s
heart; the one who had a beastly heart didn’t save the person but, the one who had a merciful
heart which understood that a human being is a human being, saved that person. That’s how
we saved people. (Interview by author, Nkora, October 2013)

A female genocide survivor who was 15 years old at the time of the genocide explained
that having a good heart was not enough: “It requires courage for people to help others
despite the risk. There is also a good heart, but it is courage” (interview by El‐Hadidi,
Biryogo, November 2013). Another female genocide survivor who was only nine years
old in 1994 explained that greed was one of the factors that separated perpetrators from
rescuers:
People rescued victims from personal compassion. In general terms people who got involved in
the violence were mostly motivated by material possessions they could get from the victims.
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They perceived the victims’ death as an opportunity to get access to their things/property.
On the positive side, there were people who were not interested in the victims’ material
possessions and preferred to rescue them because they were also convinced that the victims
were innocent. (Interview by El‐Hadidi, Nkora, October 2013)

These internal moral orientations – having a good heart, being courageous, and eschewing
material possessions – were cited frequently among interviewees who were asked about the
motivations of rescuers. While any of these human impulses could be based in religious
belief, Rwandans distinguished between these general moral orientations, based in an
understanding of a common humanity, from explicit religious faith and practice.
Because the major religions in Rwanda, including Christianity and Islam, forbid murder;
people assume that religion should have discouraged participation in the genocide.
Nonetheless, people of all faiths, and even the clergy and religious leaders, were among the
perpetrators. Christian “churches were a key factor in encouraging public involvement” in
the 1994 genocide because they helped “make participating in the killing morally acceptable” (Longman 2009: 306). The Roman Catholic Church had close ties to the state in
Rwanda. Thus, when Catholic leaders failed to issue “a prompt, firm condemnation of the
killing campaign” and, instead, expressed support for the new regime controlled by Hutu
extremists, government officials and propagandists could “assert that the slaughter met
with God’s favor” (Des Forges 1999: 246). In the absence of any other clear message from
the church, many Christians concluded that participation in the genocide, or their “defense
of the nation,” which was how they perceived their actions, was the will of God. The broad
participation of Christians was not due to an insufficient conversion or adherence to
doctrine; rather, the church’s historical integration with and support of the patrimonial
networks of the Rwandan state implicated it in the state’s genocide project.
People of all faiths were also among the victims. Unlike many other instances of communal
violence or genocide, such as the Holocaust in Europe or the civil wars in Northern Ireland,
Sri Lanka, or Bosnia‐Herzegovina, religion did not serve as “an ascriptive identifier to single
out” individuals to kill in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Longman 2009: 306). Christian
churches became key massacre sites as ethnic Tutsis, and others targeted in the genocide,
gathered in them to seek sanctuary from the killing. In previous instances of communal
violence in 1959, 1962, 1963, and 1972, churches had served as places of refuge, and perpetrators of violence had not dared desecrate them. In 1994 the extremist Hutus who planned
and carried out the genocide used this history as a strategy to concentrate their victims and
make it easier to dispatch them en masse. They encouraged Tutsis to gather at these sites for
their own protection and then brought in soldiers, militiamen, and the local population to kill
them. Mosques rarely became massacre sites, because the imams closed them during the
genocide and instructed Muslims to pray at home (interviews by author and El‐Hadidi,
various locations, Rwanda, 2013).
Islam did not arrive in Rwanda until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
around the same time as European colonialism and Christian missionaries (Kagabo 1988: 17).
European colonizers were generally hostile to Islam (Kagabo 1988: 18), but they allowed
“Arabs” from East Africa (usually Muslim Africans or descendants of traders who had migrated
to East Africa from the Middle East or India) to establish commercial outposts in the new
colony (Ruanda‐Urundi). These economic centers became sites of Islamic conversion thanks
to economic ties forged between Arab, Indian, and Swahili traders and the local population
(Kagabo 1988: 60–84). Yet, Muslims in Rwanda, whether they were foreigners, immigrants
and their descendants, or local converts, lived largely apart from the rest of the Rwandan
population in Muslim neighborhoods in commercial centers around the country.
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Because of their distinct language (Swahili), style of dress, foods, and habits, Rwandan
Muslims were perceived as foreigners in their own country (Kagabo 1988). The anti‐Islamic
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and Catholic schools in Rwanda caused Rwandan
Muslims to be poorly perceived by their compatriots (Kagabo 1988: 45). Non‐Muslim
Rwandans traded with Muslims but otherwise avoided them. Despite this marginalization,
Muslims were perceived as wealthy because of their control of trade goods and more
European lifestyle. In eastern and southern Rwanda, some Tutsi nobles married their
daughters to Muslim men. This pattern of Tutsi in‐marriage continued into the postcolonial period. As a result, many Rwandan Muslims had Tutsi mothers. Negative perceptions
of Rwandan Muslims continued in the postcolonial period. Few Muslims achieved a formal
education beyond primary school unless they found the means to continue their studies
abroad (Kagabo 1988: 218; Kasule 1982: 41, 138–141).
Religion featured prominently in some explanations of rescuer behavior and the distinctions between people who joined the genocide and those who refused to participate. Both
Muslim and Christian rescuers depicted a fear of God as part of their motivation for trying
to help Tutsis, or characterized their actions as purely being an instrument of God’s will. As
one Muslim rescuer explained:
Our religion, Islam, doesn’t allow people to spill our neighbors’ blood. We looked and we only
saw brothers here. You could not think about killing this person, because he was a brother,
someone who would have rescued you too, if you needed help. (Interview by author,
Mugandamure, July 2013)

Another Muslim elder who saved many Tutsis during the genocide explained, “I’m so poor
in this life, how is it possible to lose both heaven and earth in this lifetime?” Another
Muslim rescuer clarified, “It was not me; it was Allah who protected them” (interview by
El‐Hadidi, Gisenyi, October 2013). In response to being asked why he saved people, a
Catholic man said, “God and my Christian belief” (interview by El‐Hadidi, Gisenyi,
November 2013). A Pentecostal man who was a soldier in the Rwandan army explained:
I was a soldier inside Rwanda. I was a Christian from ADEPR. Following my beliefs and how I
saw other religions, the true believer didn’t participate in the Genocide. I mean the true faith
is not about religion. Whether it is a Muslim, a Catholic, an Adventist, and my fellow Pentecost,
those who were true believers never got involved. I am among those who rescued people, and
among those who did not participate. (Interview by El‐Hadidi, Nyanza, August 2013)

The moral grey zone created in the chaos of genocide, along with the moment‐by‐moment
decision‐making necessitated by the complex and constantly evolving situation, resulted in
rescuer behavior being quite common but rescuers being exceptional. Being a rescuer or
perpetrator is not a binary or static identity. Rather, rescuer behavior was formed by a complex interconnection between extrinsic and intrinsic factors that impacted an individual’s
choices, decisions, and opportunities to resist genocide. To be a rescuer, a person needed the
personal conviction or moral compass that impelled them to behave morally, but they also
needed the opportunity and the skills and resources to make their actions successful. Most
importantly, they required the patience, persistence, and fortitude to make the right decisions
many times each day over several weeks or even months. To become a participant in the
genocide only took one momentary decision, for example, putting one’s family’s or their
own safety ahead of those whom they were protecting. In short, becoming a rescuer meant
making the decision to rescue over and over again and not only once.
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Silence
In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, many survivors felt compelled to recognize the
courageous individuals who had helped save their lives. Yet, they found that the political
context made it too risky. As a national representative of the genocide survivors’ association,
Ibuka, explained: “There have been moments when it has been impossible to talk about
rescuers during the genocide. Immediately after, many of us tried to [publicly] recognize
the people who saved us, but we discovered it wasn’t wise. The government didn’t want to
hear about it” (author’s interview with Ibuka national representative, Kigali, October
2013). In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the new government led by the former
rebel movement and army, the RPF, was focused on locating and imprisoning genocide
perpetrators. The majority of these suspects were Hutu, especially young Hutu men. As a
result, the government was not interested in publicly recognizing Hutus who had rescued
Tutsis. Furthermore, the phenomenon of the “killer‐rescuers,” those who had killed some
while rescuing others, was coming to light (Fujii 2011). Thus, rescuers themselves were
reluctant to be known publicly for fear of becoming suspected of genocide crimes.
When I conducted research in Rwanda in the late 1990s, few people talked openly about
the 1994 genocide (Burnet 2012: 79). While the reasons for their silence were numerous,
principal among them was fear of attracting attention that could lead to accusations of
genocide crimes. Rescuers, in particular, remained silent. A Hutu man explained:
I tried to save someone. He stayed here in my house for four weeks. He climbed over the rear
wall [pointing to the compound wall behind the house]. We didn’t know him … I kept him
here … Then, we decided to flee. We could not bring him with us. I don’t know what happened
to him … I do not say these things because people can misunderstand or twist my words to say
that I am the one who had him killed. (Interview by author, Kigali, 2011)

Despite its official policy of national unity, Rwandan government practices of national
memory and genocide commemoration in the late 1990s and early 2000s politicized victimhood and globalized blame on Hutus (Burnet 2009: 80). During this period, the government
exercised tight control over public representations of the genocide. The annual genocide
commemoration ceremonies often included public recognition of people who had risked
their lives to save Tutsis in the genocide. In most instances, a genocide survivor would give
testimony and present the person who had helped them. The rescuer would then say a few
words about why they had done what they did. National Heroes Day recognized stories of
rescue among other types of national heroes. For example, Félicité Niyitegeka, who saved
scores of Tutsis in Gisenyi and died with others whom she refused to abandon, is among
the national heroes. Such stories of rescue, performed as part of government‐sponsored
commemoration activities, contained these narratives in official, public discourse and ensured
that they did not create public heroes who could become potential political rivals of the RPF
party or its candidates.
Stories of rescuers promoted outside of official Rwandan government channels often
faced public opposition. Internationally perhaps the best‐known rescuer is Paul Rusesabagina,
the hotel manager who saved people at the Hôtel des Mille Collines, as portrayed in the
film Hotel Rwanda. His story was first recounted by the journalist Philip Gourevitch in his
1998 book, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families. This
story caught the attention of writer and director Terry George, who then researched
Rusesabagina’s story and wrote and directed the film, which was released in 2004. In 2005
Rwandan journalists began a smear campaign against Rusesabagina.10 The campaign begun
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by journalists was then taken up by politicians, culminating in President Kagame condemning Rusesabagina by name during the twelfth national genocide commemoration ceremony
on April 6, 2006 (George 2006). The campaign against Rusesabagina has continued in the
Rwandan and international media.11 Rusesabagina is but one example of a rescuer who
gained public attention outside of Rwandan government channels and then found himself
or herself the target of a smear campaign or other forms of coercion. These examples
encouraged rescuers in Rwanda, as well as genocide survivors who wanted to recognize
them publicly, to remain largely silent.
Once the Gacaca courts completed their work in the late 2000s, public discourse opened
slightly on the question of rescuers. In 2009 the national genocide survivors’ association
Ibuka launched a pilot research project to identify people it called indakemwa, meaning
“those who are morally beyond reproach.” The definition of indakemwa was largely based
on the state of Israel and Yad Vashem’s designation of “Righteous Among the Nations,” to
recognize non‐Jews who risked their lives, freedom, or safety to save one or more Jews
during the Holocaust without any financial compensation or other reward (Tevosyan
2008: 186). Ibuka defined indakemwa as people (1) who had saved one or more Tutsis
during this genocide; (2) who had not received any compensation for their actions; (3) who
had not participated in the genocide by killing, physically assaulting, tracking or hunting,
denouncing or revealing Tutsis in hiding, or by stealing or destroying property; and (4) who
testified about the genocide and did not spread genocide ideology (Kayishema and Masabo
2010: 22–24). This last requirement extends infinitely into the future, meaning that a
person who qualifies as indakemwa can lose their status if they say or do something perceived
as spreading genocide ideology. In this pilot study, Ibuka identified 372 people around the
country whom it designated as “presumed indakemwa” (Kayishema and Masabo 2010: 25).
The organization has not yet found funding to continue its research or to create a permanent
process for identifying and verifying indakemwa (interviews by author, Rwanda, 2014–2016).
These ongoing efforts to recognize rescuers in a formal and public way have the potential
to provide models of behavior and decision‐making that oppose genocide in both ideology
and action. Accounting for the good amid the overwhelming evil of genocide provides
some survivors with hope and a renewed faith in humans.
Rescuers, especially those who survived the genocide, were exceptional. Like many
others, they had the compulsion to save others. Rescuers had “good hearts,” were “courageous,” and did not succumb to greed, but these internal moral orientations were not
enough. What set rescuers apart from those who resisted for days or weeks and then participated in the genocide was that rescuers persisted in this conviction over long periods of
time and succeeded in their efforts to rescue Tutsis. Thus, the internal features of moral
behavior – character, identity, personality, religious belief, or self‐perception – do not on
their own distinguish rescuers from genocide resisters, bystanders, or perpetrators. Nor can
the external features that affect rescuer behavior – geography, timelines, proximity, or
opportunity – account for these distinctions. Being a rescuer or a perpetrator was not a
static, unchanging identity. The complex interplay between personal conviction, moral
compulsion, and religious orientation, along with external factors, makes it possible for
some people to choose to rescue, to refuse to participate in genocide, to persist in these
choices and to make them repeatedly, and to succeed in making their conviction reality.
They demonstrated enormous courage and great ingenuity by providing water, food,
clothing, or shelter; by warning people of search parties or attacks; by negotiating for p
 eople’s
lives in exchange for money, cigarettes, beer, or livestock; by hiding or protecting children
whose parents had been killed; and by smuggling people to safety. In these acts, rescuers
faced the grey zone of genocide where they were forced to make morally ambiguous
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decisions. Sometimes, in order to succeed in their attempts to rescue, rescuers had to
abandon someone they had helped, to turn people over to soldiers or police who carry a
warrant even though they are likely to be killed, or to ask someone to leave.

Notes
1

Estimates of how many people died in the 1994 genocide range from 500,000 (Des Forges 1999: 15)
to 1 million (MINALOC 2004: 21). For more on the numbers of dead and their politicization,
see Scott Straus (2006: 51).
2 “Achievements of the ICTR,” http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/achievements.htm
(accessed September 15, 2007).
3 I use “Gacaca” to refer to the Gacaca courts instituted to adjudicate genocide cases and gacaca
to refer to the informal, traditional conflict resolution mechanism.
4 This research was supported by the University of Louisville Research Foundation and
Department of Anthropology and the National Science Foundation under Grant Nos. 1230062
and 1550655. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science
Foundation.
5 I owe thanks to the editor Antonius Robben for his detailed and thought‐provoking commentary on an earlier draft of this chapter. In this section on the moral grey zone, in particular,
his comments helped me reconsider and refine my analysis both of Levi’s concept and of my
application of it to the Rwandan case.
6 All interviewee names are pseudonyms. Human subjects protocols granted all participants
anonymity.
7 Interview by author, Gisenyi, 2013.
8 Interviews by author and El‐Hadidi, Mugandamure, 2013.
9 Interviews by author and El‐Hadidi, Nkora and Boneza, 2013.
10 The film’s director, Terry George, defended the version of events recounted in the film and
explained the timeline of the smear campaign against Rusesabagina in a Washington Post opinion
editorial in May 2006 (George 2006).
11 See, e.g., Melvern 2011.
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